Human Resource Management in a Business Context

by Alan Price

Provides a thorough and comprehensive overview of all the key aspects of people management using numerous real examples from actual business situations.

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Japan

Disneyland in Japan is virtually an exact copy of the original Californian development but with some features ostensibly adapted for the Japanese market. For example, "Main Street USA", a highly-idealised version of small-town America, is renamed "World Bazaar". Yoshimoto (1994) argues that the opening in 1983 had symbolic value for a generation seeking to dissociate or 'move on' from the Second World War. Success also is attributed to 'the absolute separation of leisure from work'. With maintenance and other utilitarian functions effectively invisible, Disneyland offers an almost unique opportunity for Japanese visitors to forget about everyday working life. Yoshimoto (1994) suggests that with its focus on order and minute attention to detail in management Disneyland 'is arguably the most Japanese institution in the United States'. Equally, those same preoccupations make the Japanese market ideal for Disney: 'the epitome of American popular culture'.

Euro Disney

Euro Disney opened in April 1992 in an agricultural area just outside Paris of which it was one fifth the size (Anthony et al., 1992). The French site was chosen over its main rival in Spain in the face of significant local opposition, despite the anticipated creation of 30,000 jobs. As in Florida, the French government agreed to substantial financial and tax incentives and to make major improvements to transport infrastructure. Ease of access for the populations of a number of European countries was seen as a major advantage, offsetting potential problems caused by inclement weather associated with a more northerly location. The success of Tokyo Disneyland was cited in support. More extensive European holiday entitlements and the enduring popularity of Paris were also relevant factors. However, early visitor attendance was significantly below projected levels leading to a trading deficit and substantial reduction in share value.

The project was promoted and defended by senior company managers in America, but other analysts questioned whether the Disney ethos would be compatible with French culture. While incorporating many standard Disney theme park features, some adjustments were made in response to these criticisms. Links were made with European literature and mythology. As in Tokyo Disneyland, renaming was used as a marketing device, resulting in Euro Disney reflecting European interest in the history of western United States. Unlike Tokyo, an international cuisine was provided, served in accordance with European social and eating patterns. However, the non-availability of alcohol proved controversial. Faced with charges of cultural imperialism the corporation had to reassure the government that French was technically the first language in the complex. However, employees also were expected to be fluent in English and signs were bilingual (Anthony et al., 1992). These dilutions of the Disney image led to the counter claim that the corporation was trying to be "all things to all people" and would be less successful as a result.

As at its other complexes, Euro Disney placed particular emphasis on rigorous training, orienting employees to the global corporate philosophy. As early as 1961 the company had created the Disney University for this purpose, located at individual sites and also addressing issues of specific local relevance. The Euro Disney division opened in September 1991. The aim was to recruit 10,000 people in six months with nationalities to reflect anticipated visitor profiles. However, when the development opened 70 per cent of employees were French compared to the target of 45 per cent. A total of 270 managers had been trained in service delivery standards operating in the other three centres. An additional 200 experienced Disney managers were relocated to the French site. From the outset Euro Disney was criticised for elements of its selection process and human resources management. In particular stringent requirements regarding personal appearance were compared unfavourably with the approach of other employers. In addition, some 4000 employees were unable to find suitable, affordable accommodation in the vicinity.

Retention also proved to be a problem. Within the first nine weeks, 1000 of those appointed left, about 50 per cent voluntarily. Doubts were raised about whether people familiar with European work expectations would be able to adapt to the regimented enthusiastic service-driven ethos required by Disney. Unreasonable working conditions, poor communication and lack of cultural awareness among managers were the main reasons given for the staff turnover (Anthony et al., 1992). See Walt Disney Company's Euro Disneyland Venture: A study in corporate foreign expansion by Lyn Burgoyne for more details.

Branded merchandise

The Walt Disney Company has promoted branded merchandise since 1930 and has contracts with about 3000 factories worldwide (MacAdam, 1998). The National Labor Committee, an American human rights advocacy group, has highlighted the position of 2000 Disney workers in Haiti, the poorest country in the Caribbean. Unemployment is about 70 per cent and subcontracting a vital source of income. The National Labor Committee attempted to persuade the Walt Disney Company to allow independent monitoring of terms and conditions in their four Haitian plants. At first Disney claimed that it had no employees in Haiti and no responsibility for subcontractors. It then sent its own representatives but refused requests for independent monitors. The company's chief executive, Michael Eisner, received over $185 million in pay and share options in 1996. MacAdam (1998) points out that one hour's remuneration for Eisner was the equivalent of 156 years work for a Haitian machine operator producing Disney clothing.

More recently, the Walt Disney Company has focused attention on the lucrative Chinese market. The familiar story of low-cost production emerges again (Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee, 1999). In 1996, the company launched a Chinese-language radio station broadcasting from Hong Kong. Chinese state television uses the Disney network for 50 per cent of programming on its specialist sports channel. The company's 1998 animated film Mulan is based on a Chinese legend and represents a "strategic incursion" into the Chinese film market (Maio, 1998). There are plans for a Chinese Disneyland.

Copyright ©2000 Alan Price and hrmguide.com. All rights reserved.

References

Designing Organizations: An Executive Guide to Strategy, Structure, and Process Revised